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§1  PROLOGUE 
 
As early as 1741 a Jekel Reinach is mentioned in the Memory Book of the Jewish 
community in Mainz, and by the end of the century the Reinachs were already one 
of the most notable and well-to-do Jewish families in the city.2 The Record of 
Names of 1808 lists Salomon (formerly Seligmann) Reinach, Jacques (Mayer 
Herz) Reinach, Marx (Mayer Herz) Reinach, and Bernard Jacques (Beer Jacob) 
Reinach.3 The descendants of Jacques Reinach spread from Mainz to Frankfurt 
and from there to Paris. His grandson Adolf von Reinach (1814–1879), Belgian 
consul in Frankfurt, was created an Italian Baron in 1866, and founded the French 
Banking family of de Reinach – not to be confused with the Alsatian barons de 
Reinach – which played a major role in republican circles around the French 
politician Gambetta. In 1850 Adolf’s twin brother Hermann Joseph Reinach, then 
already established in Paris, married Julie Büding from Kassel. Among the three 
sons of this marriage Salomon (1858–1932), a prominent archaeologist and his-
torian of religion, became a professor at the École du Louvre. He also translated 
Schopenhauer and established a critical edition of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei. 
His brother Théodore (1860–1923), professor of numismatics at the Collège de 
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  The few existing published biographies of Reinach are, if not unreliable (Oesterreicher 
1952), then at best very succinct (Avé-Lallemant 1975, 172–74, Crosby 1983, XI–X). In 
compiling the present essay we have used in particular Reinach’s letters to Husserl (Husserl 
Archives) and to Conrad and Daubert (Bavarian State Library, Munich). We draw further 
on Avé-Lallemant’s Catalogue of the Münchener Phänomenologennachlässe, on Schuhmann’s 
Husserl-Chronik (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), and on the pertinent Vorlesungsverzeichnisse of 
the University of Göttingen. We have also profited from the “Historical Introduction” to 
Brettler 1974, 1–15. References not here given in full are to be found in the Reinach biblio-
graphy on pp. 299–332 below. 
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Stiftung, under whose kind auspices Smith’s contributions to this essay were written. 
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France, was a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, and editor of the 
works of the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus. The oldest of the three brothers 
was Joseph (1856–1921), a politician who was for some time a collaborator of 
Gambetta and played a major role in the so-called Dreyfus affair. He also wrote 
a book on Diderot. His son Adolphe Reinach (1887–1914) did archaeological 
field work in Greece and Egypt. He was killed as a soldier in the French army 
during the first months of the First World War. 
 
 
§2  1883–1904: FROM MAINZ TO MUNICH 
 
Adolf Bernhard Philipp Reinach was born in Mainz on December 23, 1883. 
Adolf’s father, Wilhelm Markus Reinach (1849–1931) owned a factory in Mainz 
producing sanitary and lighting equipment. His mother, Pauline Eugenie (1851–
1932), was the daughter of the merchant Heinrich Hirschhorn and Fanny, née 
Büding, of Mannheim. Wilhelm’s father, the Geheimer Kommerzienrat Hermann 
Reinach (1825–1906), was for many years städtischer Beigeordneter and honorary 
citizen of the city of Mainz. 
Adolf was the oldest of three children. His brother Heinrich, born on 4 June 
1888, studied mainly law and philosophy, at first in Munich and Göttingen, and 
then later in the University of Giessen, where he earned his Doctorate in Law in 
1910. His dissertation – Die Rechtsfähigkeit der Leibesfrucht – was a study of the 
question whether the unborn child has, or could have, legal rights and duties in 
civil law. Heinrich subsequently entered legal practice and during the 1920s he 
published reports on tax and business law. He was imprisoned after the Kristallnacht 
of 9 November 1938, but was able to emigrate in 1939 to Brazil. Adolf’s sister 
Pauline entered the Benedictine convent at Wépion (Namur) in Belgium in 1924. In 
1936 the convent moved to Ermeton-sur-Biert, where Pauline (Sister Augustina) 
died in 1977, having reached her 95th year. 
In the Ostergymnasium in Mainz, Reinach acquired a deep interest in Plato: 
 
The reading of Plato was, for the average grammar school student, nothing 
more than a translation exercise. Reinach however found himself so gripped 
by the content, that for as along as he lived the love of Plato and for philo-
sophical analysis was never to leave him. Thus it was for him a matter of course, 
when his time at school was over, to turn to the study of philosophy.4 
 
He entered the University of Munich in the autumn of 1901, when he was still 
only 17 years of age. For three semesters he attended courses in a range of sub-
jects, including political economy, art history and law. His main interest, however, 
was in psychology and philosophy, which he studied under Theodor Lipps. Reinach 
quickly became a member of the Munich “Akademische Verein für Psychologie”, 
the discussion club of Lipps’ students which was to play so important a role in the 
formation of early phenomenological movement.5 It was almost certainly 
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at the meetings of the Verein that he came into contact with Theodor Conrad,6 
Moritz Geiger,7 Otto Selz,8 Aloys Fischer,9 Rudolf Hirsch,10 Alfred Schwenninger,11 
and Eduard Schmidt,12 who were at that time among the most outstanding of 
Lipps’ students.  
It was however Johannes Daubert who was intellectually the most important 
figure among the Munich phenomenologists, and it was Daubert who was to be of 
most significance for Reinach’s later philosophical development. Already in this 
period Daubert was working on just those topics – positive and negative judgements, 
impersonalia, dispositions, Sachverhalt and Gegenstand – which were later to play 
a central role in Reinach’s work. 
A letter to Conrad of January 31, 1903 testifies to the range of Reinach’s in-
terests at this time: 
 
I’m reading Wundt’s Grundriß der Psychologie . . . attending Lipps’ lectures on 
Psychology and Aesthetics, and have to write up a paper for his seminar . . . But 
I occupy myself more assiduously with Richard Wagner . . . I have plunged with 
such sympathy into his works and am trying to get clear about his aesthetic 
principles. 
 
 
In the same letter, Reinach has this to say about his plans for the future: 
 
                                                 
6
  Author of Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens, The Hague, Nijhoff, 
1968. 
7 
 Geiger published works in a range of subjects, from aesthetics and theoretical psychology to 
the axiomatics of Euclidean geometry. 
8
  Selz was an important member of the Würzburg school of psychologists around Oswald 
Külpe and Karl Bühler. His magnum opus, Über die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs 
(2 vols., Stuttgart: Spemann, 1913, Bonn: Cohen, 1922), contains anticipations of ideas on 
problem-solving which have since played a role in computer-oriented work in cognitive theory. 
9
  See Aloys Fischer, Leben und Werk, vol. I, ed., by Karl Kreitmair, Munich: Bayerischer 
Schulbuchverlag, 1950. 
10
 Author of a review of W. Jerusalem’s Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik, in 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 134, 1909, 266–74. This review con-
tains a defence of Husserl’s Logical Investigations against Jerusalem’s attaches which is entirely 
characteristic of the Munich phenomenologists. Husserl’s suggestion that Hirsch served in 
1905/06 as private secretary to Brentano (see his letter to Brentano of 3 January 1905, pub-
lished in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 6, 1978, p. 7) is erroneous (Hirsch was at that time in 
Munich), but seems to be correct for 1906/07. He studied in Munich, with some interruptions, 
from 1899 to 1912. In later years he lived in his home town of Pilsen (now Pizeň, Czecho-
slovakia). 
11
 The psychiatrist Schwenninger studied in Munich from 1901 to 1907. He wrote a disser-
tation entitled Der Sympathiebegriff bei David Hume, in which he expounds Hume’s treatment 
of the concept of sympathy as presented in both the Treatise and the Enquiry. Hume is cri-
ticised in particular for his psychologism and for the failure to distinguish between perception 
and perceived object. Schwenninger later moved over to the medical field, where he was in close 
touch with Ludwig Binswanger. 
12
 After studying philosophy and psychology under Lipps from 1899–1901, Schmidt 
became an archaeologist. He took his dissertation under Furtwängler with a work entitled 
Lauf und Flug in der archäisch-griechischen Kunst (1908). 
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I will not become a psychologist, an aesthetician, a critic or the like. The fact 
that I still lack the capacity for the intensive work that is required of a psycho-
logist probably does not mean much, as I am still very young. But I am only too 
well aware that I lack also true sympathy and enthusiasm for the subject-matter, 
and that is of greater significance.13 
 
In the winter term of 1901/02 and in the subsequent summer term Hermann 
Kantorowicz, the philosopher of law who was later to found the Freirechtsschule 
(Free Law Movement), had stayed in Munich, taking some courses on political 
economy, a field taught at the University there by Lujo Brentano, brother of 
the philosopher Franz Brentano. In Lujo Brentano’s seminar Reinach and Kanto-
rowicz seem to have come into contact with each other. When Kantorowicz, in the 
winter of 1902/03, moved to Berlin where he continued his work on the history of 
law, he probably set Reinach an example which motivated him to follow Kan-
torowicz. At any rate Reinach spent the summer term of 1903 in Berlin, too, 
where his energies do not, however, seem to have been directed towards either 
philosophy or psychology. He apparently studied there mainly jurisprudence, and 
Kantorowicz reported that he was impressed by Reinach’s ‘considerable talent and 
aspirations.’14 
In the winter term of 1903/04 he returned to Munich, where he stayed for three 
further semesters, working in particular on Husserl, though his attention was 
caught also by Stefan Witasek’s criticism of Lipps’ Leitfaden der Psychologie15 
During this period he figured as an experimental subject in a series of experiments 
on the psychological problem of intensive magnitudes and on phenomenal 
thresholds which were carried out by Moritz Geinger.16 Together with Geiger and 
Conrad, Reinach attended the first congress of the newly-founded “Gesellschaft 
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 ‘On the other hand’, Reinach goes on, 
life out there attracts me powerfully. I feel moved to rush into it and to act against all those 
vile scoundrels who are active there. But for politics one needs political economy and that 
is why I have chosen this as a subsidiary subject, for the time being at least. For when all is 
said and done, I want to earn my doctorate in psychology in the first place, on the one hand 
because philosophy is a good thing for me as a person, and then also because I don’t exactly 
know whether I would not at a later date like to switch over to it. 
14
 Letter of Kantorowicz to Gustav Radbruch, quoted in Karlheinz Muscheler, Relativismus 
und Freiheit. Ein Versuch über Hermann Kantorowicz, Heidelberg: C. F. Müller Jurìstischer 
Verlag, 1984, 61, n.234. Reinach refers in passing to the Freirechtsschule in his article on 
William James: see p. 293 in this volume. Kantorowicz later moved to Oxford, from where 
he exerted some influence on Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy. On his activities in Munich see 
Karlheinz Muscheler, Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz, Eine Biographie, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1984, 17–23. 
15
 Letter to Conrad of April 1904, Witasek’s review is in the Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung, 
1904, Nr. 80, 33–35. 
16
  See Geiger, “Methodologische und experimentelle Beiträge zur Quantitätslehre”, in T. 
Lipps, ed., Psychologische Untersuchungren, 2, 1906, 325–522. In contrast to Meinong, who 
utilised an opposition between ‘divisible’ and ‘indivisible’ magnitudes, Geiger formulated an 
opposition between difference magnitudes and intensive magnitudes. This enabled him to 
take account e.g. of the fact that distances between objects are non-intensive yet also non-divisible. 
 
 
5
für experimentelle Psychologie”, which was held in Giessen from 18 to 21 April 
1904, immediately before the start of the summer term.17 
Most of his time seems, however, to have been devoted to work for his doctoral 
examinations in history and penal law and to the preparation of his thesis. This may 
have been the reason why he described the summer term of 1904 as a ‘nervous 
and unphilosophical semester’.18 One problem which caught his attention he 
characterised as follows: 
 
The question: how does the child know that grown-up people ‘mean’ something 
by their words, is answered by Lipps thus: it sees how they point to something 
and simultaneously hears a complex of sounds. To me this seems merely to be a 
way of getting round the problem. For words and pointing, no matter whether 
the latter consists in moving the arms, in a play of features, etc., are special 
cases of expression in general. And the problem was: how does the child come to 
understand an expression, and more specifically the expression of words? To 
this one surely cannot give an answer which involves appeal to another form of 
expression, to ‘pointing’. For then of course the question still remains: How 
does the child know that by moving the arms etc. something is meant?19 
 
This problem has of course a distinctly Wittgensteinian ring, like so much of 
Reinach’s philosophy. It is not solved by Reinach in his letter, but its appearance 
at this early stage gives a hint of the acuteness of his philosophical mind. The pro-
blem arose in connection with Reinach’s work on what might nowadays be called 
legal hermeneutics: how are we to determine the intentions of the law-giver, given 
that these intentions are available to us only in written or printed words? 
On December 20, 1904, three days before his 21st birthday and less than 4 years 
after entering university, Reinach earned his doctorate in philosophy under Lipps 
with a work on the concept of cause in the penal law (Reinach 1905), the first 
section of which is devoted to the general problem of legal interpretation. The 
work did not go unnoticed. It was reviewed by Gustav Radbruch, who attacked 
it for its method of interpreting the concept of the law exclusively by recourse 
to the intentions of the law-giver. He did insert one work of praise for the work, 
describing it as a ‘Talentprobe’. But Radbruch’s negative review of Reinach’s work 
caused their common friend Kantorowicz to write a strongly worded letter to 
Radbruch: 
 
Now I must really read you the riot act! How could you go down on poor 
Reinach in that way? . . . Someone like him deserves to be encouraged, not 
intimidated. And what’s most important is that he is someone who belongs with 
us with his every inclination.20 
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 The participants in the congress included G. E. Müller, Benussi, Külpe, Marbe, Messer, 
Natorp,  Twardowski and Wertheimer. 
18
 Letter to Conrad of 16 June 1905. 
19
 Letter to Conrad of 14 April 1904. 
20
  Muscheler, Relativismus und Freiheit, 61, n. 234. But Radbruch stuck to his view and, 
on September 11, 1905, answered Kantorowicz’ letter: “In Sachen Reinach kann ich Ihnen 
freilich nicht recht geben, der Mann hat mir einen außerordentlich sympathischen Brief ge-
schrieben und ich habe deshalb die Rezension nicht gern so absprechend gemacht.” 
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§3  1925–1906: THE MUNICH INVASION OF GÖTTINGEN 
 
During the subsequent vacations, which he spent at home in Mainz, Reinach re-read 
the second volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations and ‘was very delighted by it’. 
In a letter to Conrad of 16 January 1905 he recommended in particular the 3rd 
Investigation on part and whole. In February he was back in Munich with his 
friends, who now included also Alexander Pfänder,21 Hermann Erhard22 and 
Paul Raff,23 all students of Lipps. He still planned to continue his studies in 
Munich, and above all to complete the work for a degree in law, but in the vacation 
after the winter semester he gradually changed his mind and decided to go to 
Göttingen. He conveyed his reasons in a letter to Conrad: ‘The next semester 
is the last one I can spend outside Munich. I can profit much from Göttingen in 
matters of law, and finally I have great hopes in Husserl’.24 So Reinach actually 
took part in the famous ‘Munich invasion of Göttingen25 headed by Daubert and 
including also Schwenninger and Fritz Weinmann.26 
Once in Göttingen Reinach’s plans underwent another shift. As he explained to 
Conrad, 
 
I am very satisfied with my stay in Göttingen . . . My scientific expectations 
have been more than fulfilled. However, I am badly neglecting my law studies. 
But that is in the end not too great a disaster. I can’t say that my philosophical 
convictions have undergone any sort of fundamental change. Like the rest of 
us I had already been pointed in a new direction by Husserl, Natorp, Kant, 
Plato a long time before I came to Göttingen; everything I have lived through 
since we have been separated could not but push me further in this direction. 
The most salutary thing which Husserl can offer is his careful and thorough 
mode of working, something Daubert has in common with him . . . For the 
rest I have worked steadily, but intensely; I have read Husserl, Natorp and 
Cohen, and lead a very peaceful and contented life.27  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
  See H. Spiegelberg and E. Avé-Lallemant, eds., Pfänder-Studien, The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1982. 
22
  Erhard was the author of a dissertation under Lipps on Die Psychologie als angebliche 
Grundlage von Geschichte und Sozialökonomie, 1907. 
23
 Raff was responsible for a very peculiar dissertation, Zur Ästhetik der Zahl (Munich, 
1907), which deals with such problems as the characteristic aesthetic qualities of prime num-
bers and fractions, or the comparative ugliness of the numbers 8 and 10. A footnote in the 
introduction to the work reveals Raff’s Munich background. He there defines a Sachverhalt 
as follows: ‘Sachverhalt (Meinong’s “Objektiv”) . . . a technical expression (taken over from 
Husserl’s logic) for the objectual relation correlated with a positive judgement’ (4). 
24
  Undated letter of Spring 1905. 
25
  The Phenomenological Movement, 167. 
26
  Weinmann was the author of a dissertation entitled Zur Struktur der Melodie (Leipzig: 
Barth, 1904), a somewhat Pythagorean treatment of tone-relations and melodic Gestalten in 
the spirit of Lipps. Weinmann died in October 1905. 
27
  Letter of 16 June 1905. 
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Reinach found Husserl’s lectures on the theory of judgment and his two seminars 
on philosophy of history and philosophy of mathematics to be very profitable.28 
He was also in close personal contact with Husserl,29 whom he presented with a 
copy of his dissertation on July 4, 1905. He would have liked to continue his 
studies in Göttingen, but he nevertheless decided to return to Munich. This was 
not only because he badly missed his friends Conrad and Geiger, both of whom 
had stayed behind in Munich; he also had to bow to the need to further his law 
studies, ‘if only for this reason, that I shall then be able to lecture to students of 
law and tell them that there is no poorer thing on earth than a jurist who is only 
a jurist.’30 First, however, he undertook with Geiger a two week-long walking tour 
through the Black Forest.31 
Back in Munich, Reinach continued his studies there for two more semesters, 
and as he wrote to Husserl, ‘during the year which has now elapsed since my stay 
in Göttingen I have had to occupy myself very intensely and almost exclusively 
with law.’32 He did however find time in the spring vacation of 1906 to read 
Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis by the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert: ‘Not a 
pleasant experience! Read one day what he has to say about the theory of judg-
ment. You won’t know what’s hit you.’33 
Only in the second half of the summer term of 1906 was he able to play a more 
active role among the philosophers in Munich. He gave a paper in the Verein on 
“The Basic Concepts of Ethics”34 and also took part in Pfänder’s seminar on 
“The Concept of Objective Unity” and in a letter to Husserl of 27 July, 1906 he 
reported on the  
 
busy philosophical life in Munich. The Pfänder seminars are extremely stimu-
lating and fruitful. It is a true joy how penetratingly and how much without 
prejudice the problems are tackled here. The discussions in the Verein, too, are 
mostly clear and stimulating. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Daubert’s Nachlaß in the Bavarian State Library contains the only surviving record of 
these latter seminars: regarding the “Philosophische Übungen zur Einführung in die Haupt-
probleme der Mathematik: see Daubertiana A I 5/71–79. Daubert’s notes to the “Geschichts-
philosophische Übungen” are in his A I 12 (not yet transcribed). Together with the other 
Münchener, Reinach also attended Robert Vischer’s seminars on the history of art. 
29
 Husserl ‘ist sehr nett mit uns Münchnern, wir kommen sehr oft zu ihm’ (Letter to Conrad 
of 22 May 1905). 
30
 Letter to Conrad of 16 June 1905. 
31
  This is almost certainly the reason why Reinach did not participate in the memorable 
Seefeld discussions with Husserl and Pfänder in August 1905, which were attended by all the 
other members of the Munich group who had spent the semester in Göttingen. See Schuhmann, 
Husserl über Pfänder, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973, 128–31. 
32
 Letter of 27 July 1906. 
33
 Letter to Conrad, 10 May 1906. There is also evidence that Reinach attended Pfänder’s 
Logic lectures of the winter semester 1905/06 (Pfänderiana B I 3, in the Bavarian State Library). 
See GS 102, n.2. 
34
 See pp. 283–285 in this volume for a reconstruction of the text of this lecture, which was 
delivered on the 6th July. 
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By the end of the semester Reinach understandably felt exhausted. In August 
1906 he undertook a tour through the Engadin with his sister and brother. It was 
on this tour that he happened to meet the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen who was 
vacationing at Silvaplana, establishing that the latter possessed only a dim aware-
ness of Husserl’s work. 
 
 
§4  1907: BELING IN TÜBINGEN 
 
Reinach spent the winter of 1906/07 in Tübingen, mainly in order to complete 
his studies in law. On the 16th October, while making preparations for the move, 
he wrote to Conrad: 
 
Do you know what a Sachverhalt is yet? The Zivilprozeßordnung des Deutschen 
Reiches [Imperial German Code of Civil Procedure] speaks always of Sach-
verhältnisse. If you wish I can write out the paragraphs for you. I know them all 
off by heart. 
 
He attended courses on commercial law by Philipp Heck, formerly a student of 
mathematics (and sometime fellow-student of Husserl in Leipzig). He also attended 
lectures on psychology by Heinrich Maier and a miserable seminar on Spinoza by 
yet another neo-Kantian, Erich Adickes. In a letter of Nov. 26, Reinach wrote to 
Conrad paraphrasing Adickes’ criticism of Spinoza’s thesis that ‘a true idea must 
agree with its object’ (Ethics, I Axiom 6): 
 
This thesis cannot be correct, because we know nothing at all about how things 
really are – Kant, too, pointed this out – and the whole world is only in our 
consciousness, – and outside of consciousness there is nothing, – and in any 
case colours are not really colours at all but only aether-waves . . . 
 
‘God forgive them,’ Reinach wrote, ‘they know not what they do.’ 
Of much greater significance for his own later development, however, were the 
lectures and seminars he attended on the penal law by the great German legal 
theorist Ernst Beling. As he wrote to Conrad in the same letter: 
 
Some of the jurists here seem to be very clever. The penologist Beling has 
written a quite outstanding book; I guarantee you that there is more thinking 
in that book than M[aier] and A[dickes] have managed to patch together in 
all their lives . . . I would never have believed that jurists could contrast so 
favourably with philosophers. 
 
The book in question is Beling’s Die Lehre vom Verbrechen [Theory of Crime] 
of 1906,35 an investigation in what would today be called the theory of action. 
Beling is concerned with producing an ontology of criminal actions. His work 
is an investigation of the ways in which, by manifesting groups of characteristics 
of specific sorts, such actions may fall, in different ways, within the scope of the 
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law. Over more than 500 pages he discusses the various levels and types of analysis 
appropriate to: 
1. the crime considered as an action 
2. the crime considered as a typical case of a particular sort of action 
3. the crime considered as an illegal action 
4. the crime considered as an action to which guilt is attached 
5. the crime considered as an action liable to punishment, and so on.36 
He considers the relations of criminal actions of different types to each other, to 
the agent or agents involved, and to the processes of law and punishment to which 
they give rise. And he discusses the various sorts of modifications of these relations 
– the standard and non-standard ways in which a given action can be an instance of 
its type, the standard and non-standard ways in which subjects can be involved in 
crimes (as accomplices, as accessories, as victims, etc.), the standard and non-
standard ways in which a criminal action can be the object of a legal process, and 
so on.37 The importance for the penal law of the notion of typicality is clear: 
the punishment for a crime is a function of the type of behaviour that is involved. 
Beling’s work can indeed be seen as an attempt to provide an account of the various 
ways in which rightful or wrongful behaviour can come to be demarcated into 
delict-types of different sorts. 
The whole constituted by the different elements of a given piece of criminal 
behaviour constitutes a unity, Beling argues, in virtue of some ‘unifying schema’. 
In the case of battery, for example, a chain of actions is organised around the 
schema: injuring, or wrongfully bringing oneself into contact with, another indivi-
dual. If battery is to occur, then  
1. this schema must, as a matter of necessity, be realised in certain actions of 
the offender and in certain consequences on the side of the victim, and  
2. these actions and results must each be accompanied by a certain mental 
state on the part of the individuals involved. It is the unifying schema, according 
to Beling, which brings these two factors together, making of the delict-type an 
independent, integrated whole.38 Where the schema is absent, or is only partially 
realised, then the delict-type fails to be realised also, or is realised only in one or 
other modified form. 
 
                                                 
36
 To see the distinction between 2. and 3., consider, for example, the actions of a soldier 
in a state of war. 
37
 The notes which follow are derived from the summary of Beling’s position presented in 
his Die Lehre vom Tatbestand, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1930. 
38
  More precisely: Beling distinguishes between primary and secondary delict-types (the 
distinction between, for example, murder and attempted murder, or between theft and shel-
tering a thief). Where instances of primary delict-types are independent, capable of existing in 
their own right, instances of secondary delict-types are dependent formations, in need of 
supplementation by instances of corresponding primary delict-types with which they are as-
sociated. It is from the latter that they gain their unity and it is upon the latter that they 
depend for their existence. A similar sort of dependence applies also in relation to the concepts 
agent, accomplice, victim, etc. See K. Engisch, Die Idee der Konkretisierung in Recht und 
Rechtswissenschaft unserer Zeit, Heidelberg: Winter, 1953. 
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Every delict-type rests upon a unifying schema which is 
1. realised in some objective event, 
and 
2. reflected in some mental act or state on the part of the criminal. 
It is, therefore, possible to distinguish abstractly within the schema as a whole 
both external elements of action and result, and internal elements of decision, 
deliberation, premeditation, etc. These external and internal moments may con-
form or fail to conform to each other in a variety of ways, thereby yielding be-
haviour which falls within delict-types of the various kinds. 
Only in the presence of an appropriate schema can the legal process even begin 
to establish that a given individual is liable to punishment of a given sort. The penal 
law is thereby in effect a catalogue of delict-types with their associated schemata 
and associated scales of punishment. The legal sphere as a whole is in fact con-
stituted by a net of interdependent typical formations, and all other, extra-legal 
concepts (railway, dog, poison, etc.) play a role in this sphere only insofar as they 
enter into relations with such specifically legal formations. 
The relevance of Beling’s investigation to Reinach’s own legal theory will be evi-
dent already from the very style and terminology of Reinach’s monograph on 
“The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law” of 1913. Reinach indeed mentions 
explicitly in the introduction to this work that: 
 
Whilst we have limited ourselves here to the setting forth of some of the a priori 
foundations of the civil law, we are convinced that the other legal disciplines – 
especially the penal law and constitutional and administrative law – are capable 
of and require such a foundation also.39 
 
Four substantial points of similarity deserve to be mentioned here: 
i. Beling’s ‘schema’ (Tatbestand or typus regens) corresponds in a number 
of ways to Reinach’s legal formation or Rechtsgebilde, though it lacks some of the 
a priori connotations of the latter.40 
                                                 
39
 Gesammelte Schriften (= GS), 172n.; trans., 48. 
40
 The question which schemata play a role within the framework of the law is for Beling 
a normative question. He talks of the schema being constitutive or regulative for the delict-
type. (He also speaks of the schema as being logically or conceptually prior, as being that 
which makes the delict-type understandable – and he sees here an analogy with the relation 
between a piece of music and its performance.) He conceives the formation of given histori-
cally existing arrays of legal schemata as being also to some extent a matter of external social 
factors. Beling is, however, perfectly clear that the question as to which delict types exist 
in a given society and which specific scales of punishment are associated therewith is not an 
arbitrary matter – is not, e.g. a mere reflection of decisions of a law-giver. 
It is interesting that Beling, like Reinach, makes a clear terminological distinction between 
‘Tatbestand’ and ‘Sachverhalt’. Thus in his Grundzüge des Strafrechts, 1930, Beling distin-
guishes  between the Tatbestand ‘als Bestandteil des gesetzlichen . . . Rechtssatzes’ and the 
Sachverhalt ‘als den konkreten Lebensfall, der juristisch beurteilt werden soll’, a usage which 
was adopted, inter alia, by his student Karl Engisch. 
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ii. Both Beling and Reinach share the same doctrine of contextualism in legal 
theory (an element has legal significance only within the context of a Tatbestand 
or Sachverhalt). 
iii. Both share the recognition of the two-sided nature of legal formations as 
entities which manifest both internal and external dimensions. 
iv. Both share the recognition of the importance for legal theory of the dicho-
tomy between standard or typical and derived or modified instances of legal types. 
 
We shall see some of the consequences of this influence below. For the moment, 
however, we must rejoin our narrative where we left off. 
 
 
§5   1907–1909: TOWARDS A THEORY OF JUDGEMENT 
 
Reinach spent the Easter holiday of 1907 in Munich, where he met Dietrich von 
Hildebrand.41 During this first half of the summer term of 1907 Reinach was still 
at Tübingen, where from April 18 to June 6 he took the First State Examination 
in Law. On June 8 he went to Göttingen to join Conrad, who was spending the 
summer semester studying under Husserl, and it is possible that he was able to 
attend the last part of Husserl’s Dingvorlesung. At any rate he participated in 
Husserl’s Saturday afternoon discussions on themes related to the lectures on 
thing and space. 
During the three semesters that followed Reinach was again in Munich and he 
was soon actively engaged in the activities of the Verein, where works by James, 
Simmel, Łukasiewicz, Lipps, Stumpf and Bergson were being discussed.42 He also 
participated in the regular discussions at the home of Daubert, where in the sum-
mer of 1908 the concept of sensation was being discussed. At this time he came 
into close contact with Max Scheler and Wilhelm Schapp.43 
                                                 
41
  See Hildebrand’s autobiographical essay, 1975, 78: In Reinach ‘I met the philosopher 
who impressed me most deeply with his unconditional love of truth, his intellectual power, 
his thoroughness, and his quite unique clarity. The many discussions of philosophical ques-
tions I had with him were a great gift to me. In Göttingen he came to be my only teacher.’ 
Hildebrand became known mainly for his work in ethics. In later years he converted to Catho-
licism and wrote treatises of a speculative metaphysical kind based on Catholic doctrine. 
42
  On 6 February 1908 Alexander Rosenblum spoke on “Łukasiewicz: Analysis and Con-
stitution of the Concept”. On Rosenblum, a close friend of Reinach, see Husserl’s Briefe an 
Roman Ingarden, “Erläuterungen”, 143, n.12: ‘He was a well-informed phenomenologist, but 
did not publish anything. All his manuscripts were destroyed in the Jewish revolt against Nazi 
terror in Warsaw in 1944.’ 
43
 Schapp, who earned his doctorate under Husserl in 1909, is of interest here in that his 
career in some respects runs parallel to that of Reinach. He too applied logical and ontological 
notions – in his case the notion of a Geschichte (story, history) – in the sphere of legal theory. 
Geschichten, for Schapp, take the place of schemata for Beling and of Sachverhalte for Reinach, 
and they may in some respects be compared to the language games of the later Wittgenstein. 
(See Hermann Lübbe, “‘Sprachspiele’ und ‘Geschichten’”, Bewußtsein in Geschichten, Frei-
burg: Rombach, 1972, 81–114.) In his Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht, (Berlin: Verlag für 
Staatswissenschaft und Geschichte, 1930/32) Schapp states that among phenomenologists his 
position lay closest to that of Reinach, from whom ‘I have gained more than from all others’, 
though he is careful to note that both he and Reinach had received much of their training 
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At the University Reinach heard Scheler’s lectures on the history of Kantian 
and post-Kantian philosophy, and lectures on theoretical physics by Leo Grätz. 
He also discussed with Geiger the latter’s lectures on the philosophy of mathe-
matics. It is at about this time – in the summer term of 1908 – that Reinach’s 
project of writing a work on the theory of judgement was beginning to take shape, 
though he had time to write down his ideas only in the vacation that followed 
the end of the summer term. A first draft of more than 200 pages was completed 
in September 1908, and the final version – “The Nature and Systematic Theory 
of Judgement”,44 277 pages long – was ready by October 31, the last day for 
competing for the Munich Philosophy Faculty prize. Reinach rushed the manuscript 
to Theodor Lipps in order to have it submitted for the prize, but Lipps’ poor state 
of health made it impossible for him to adjudicate in the matter and the prize 
was eventually not awarded at all. Reinach accordingly decided to submit the work 
as a habilitation thesis to the University of Tübingen. It quickly became clear, 
however, that the Tübingen philosophy faculty would not accept it. Early in 
January 1909 he therefore went to Göttingen in order to explore the possibility 
of habilitating there. 
Husserl’s spontaneous reaction was highly positive and Reinach spent a good 
deal of January and February in Göttingen paving the way for his habilitation.45 
He probably knew that Husserl had delivered a highly favourable report to the 
Faculty on February 2046 and that the report of Julius Baumann had been positive 
also. Thus he returned, contented, to Munich, where he frequented Geiger’s house 
and absorbed himself in music. ‘Evening by evening,’ he wrote to Husserl, ‘I listen 
to the most beautiful concerts’.47 
Towards the end of March, however, things seemed to take a sudden turn for the 
worse. The psychologist G. E. Müller, long an embittered opponent of Husserl’s 
                                                                                                                                     
from Pfänder and Daubert (182). 
44
  This work was not published at the time, but in 1911 Reinach announced the imminent 
publication of a revised version under the title “Judgement and Sachverhalt” (see his 1911a, 
196, n.1). This note is not included in the GS, which does however contain a reference to the 
work as containing ‘investigations into the problem of judgement and the problem of the 
a priori’ (6, n.1). At the end of 1908 there must have existed two, if not three copies of the 
work, but none of them seems to have survived. It is also unclear why the project of pub-
lishing the work was never realised. 
45
  Among the materials he submitted to the Faculty was a short Lebenslauf, from which we 
reproduce the following extract: 
I spent the summer term of 1905 in Göttingen, where I occupied myself principally with 
logic and theory of cognition under the direction of Professor Husserl. During this time 
I also continued my legal and historical studies. In the conviction that it is advisable for a 
philosopher to master some individual science, I dedicated myself entirely to the study of 
jurisprudence . . . I spent the second half of the summer semester of 1907 in Göttingen, 
in order to take part in the ‘intimate seminars’ (not announced) of Professor Husserl. 
I then studied further in Munich, occupying myself mainly with investigations in logic 
and the theory of knowledge from out of which the submitted work on Wesen und Syste-
matik des Urtelis has grown. In addition I attended during this time lectures on mathe-
matics and theoretical physics. (From Reinach’s file in the Universitätsarchiv, Göttingen). 
46
 See the Appendix to Schuhmann’s essay on Husserl and Reinach in this volume. 
47
 Letter of 26 March 1909. 
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phenomenology,48 submitted a report on Reinach’s manuscript which was negative 
in the extreme.49 As Reinach conjectured in a letter to Conrad of May 3, 1909: 
Müller ‘beat the sack, but he had the donkey in mind’. That is, he had used the 
affair simply as a welcome occasion to hit out at Husserl. In his attempt to tor-
pedo the habilitation, however, Müller overstated his case so blatantly that the 
Faculty chose to follow not him but Husserl and Baumann, and by the beginning 
of May Reinach could once more be sure of the success of his habilitation. 
 
 
§6   1909–1912: WITH HUSSERL IN GÖTTINGEN 
 
Thus it was that, from the summer term of 1909 on, Reinach was firmly established 
in Göttingen. 
After Munich, the town of Vassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Thomas Mann and 
Stefan George, Göttingen was a somewhat austere and provincial place. Reinach 
referred to it as a ‘dirty nest’ and he never felt really at home.50 Nor could he 
expect much sympathy from the bulk of the faculty members who were to be his 
colleagues. On May 3, 1909 he wrote to Conrad: ‘I become more and more afraid 
that habilitating in Göttingen was the most stupid thing I have done in all my life’. 
He nonetheless began to develop modest plans for the future. 
 
I hope that in Göttingen I shall obtain what I aspire to: peaceful scientific work, 
sure of its goal, and a fruitful influence upon a circle of young people – even if, 
as befits my own scientific orientation, this circle should not be so large. (I’ll 
gladly do without large audiences enticed by lectures free of charge and by an 
‘unequivocal liberalism’.) Only in this way can I hold on to the inner concen-
tration that is necessary to me.51  
 
Reinach moved to Göttingenin in mid-May 1909, when the semester had already 
begun. He organised an informal seminar on ‘the main ideas of the new movement 
initiated by Husserl, with special reference to their historical context’.52 The topics 
                                                 
48
 Müller was one of the last representatives in Germany of the empiricist, associationis-
tic approach to psychology. Husserl’s phenomenology was, as far as he was concerned, nothing 
but pure verbiage (‘Wortklauberei’: see H. Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and 
Psychiatry, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, 34). Compare however n.53 below. 
49
 Though it did in fact conclude with the recommendation that Reinach should be admitted 
to the habilitation. 
50
  Postcards to Conrad of 8 March and 5 December 1909. 
51
 Letter to Husserl of 6 May 1909. 
52
 In an undated letter to Conrad of May or June 1909, Reinach gives the theme of his 
seminar as “die Hauptideen der neuen, von Husserl eigeleiteten Bewegung”. This is of par-
ticular interest, since it seems to be the first place where phenomenology is referred to as a 
‘Bewegung’, a manner of speech which would have been familiar to Reinach both from the 
German ‘Jugendbewegung’ of the time and also, perhaps, from William James’ Pragmatism of 
1907, Jerusalem’s German translation of which had just appeared. In his “Markers on the Road 
to the Phenomenological Movement” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43, 1983, 
299–306) Schuhmann had traced the term to the year 1912, when it was used by Husserl 
and Conrad-Martius, and the fact that the latter was a devoted student of Reinach lends plausi-
bility to the thesis that it is he who was responsible for so fatefully baptising phenomenology 
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discussed included the concept of categorial intuition and the problems associated 
with the perception of states of affairs, and among the twenty participants one may 
note the names of von Hildebrand, Schapp and the psychologist David Katz.53 
On June 12, 1909 Reinach gave a public lecture on “Problems and Methods of 
Ethics”, thus completing the formal requirements for admission as a Privatdozent. 
This theme had been chosen by the Faculty from the three titles submitted by 
Reinach on January 30, the two others being: “Intuition and Cognition” and 
“Subjectless Sentences”. While the former clearly draws on Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, the latter employs the title of a long series of articles published in 
the period 1884–1895 by Brentano’s disciple Anton Marty. Reinach’s attention 
was drawn to the problem of impersonal sentences (‘It’s raining’, ‘It’s cold’, ‘It 
hungreth me’) by his mentor Daubert.54 Already in his habilitation thesis Reinach 
had interpreted impersonalia as one-membered judgements about one-membered 
states of affairs. Later on he put the point as follows: ‘If one demands of states 
of affairs that they be two-membered, then this is to confuse states of affairs with 
relations.’55 In fact states of affairs are divided by Reinach into ‘one-membered, 
in impersonalia, two-membered, in normal categorial judgements, and three- or 
more-membered, in relational judgements.’56 
The impact made by Reinach as a teacher is well expressed by Spiegelberg: 
 
Independently of each other, the Göttingen students of phenomenology like 
Wilhelm Schapp, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré and Edith Stein, 
in their accounts of this period refer to Reinach, not to Husserl, as their real 
teacher in phenomenology. Hedwig Conrad-Martius even goes so far as to call 
him the phenomenologist par excellence.57 
 
Reinach excelled through the brilliance and above all through the clarity of his 
lectures and seminars – a clarity which shines through also in his writings. Husserl, 
in contrast, was notorious for his monologising seminars and for his inability to 
follow other people’s arguments. As Roman Ingarden points out, Reinach was not 
only 
 
A good teacher but above all brilliant in directing philosophical seminars. In his 
“Seminars for Advanced Students” he himself always outlined a central problem 
which was then worked on in the course of the academic year. The most in-
teresting and instructive seminar in the last year of his activity was devoted to 
the problems of movement. The formulations he gave were clear and sharp, the 
                                                                                                                                     
as a ‘movement’ in 1909. 
53
 Katz was later to become famous through his book Die Erscheinungsweise der Farben 
und ihre Beeinflussung durch die individuelle Erfahrung (Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Ergän-
zungsband 7), the 2nd edition of which was published in an abridged translation as The World 
of Colour (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1935). This work was written under the 
direction of G. E. Müller but as Katz himself points out (see p. 30 of the German edition), it 
was influenced also by Husserl’s lectures in Göttingen. 
54
  See the fragment on impersonal sentences in the Gesammelte Schriften, 117–20; §12 of 
Smith’s trans. of “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils”. 
55
  Ana 379 B II 4, 250. 
56
 Ibid., 292. See also GS, 92, n.2 = Smith trans. 346. 
57
  The Phenomenological Movement, 191f. 
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answers he gave to the participants in the seminars were precise and crisp, the 
arguments with which he defended his position were decisive, and he knew how 
to present vivid and convincing examples. What was especially valuable was the 
fact that he had the capacity immediately to understand and to see the correct 
context for our often awkwardly formulated questions or assertions. The course 
of the discussions was left to the participants, Reinach himself apparently 
functioning simply as custodian, seeing to it that one did not go astray. In fact 
however he was the very heart of our collective efforts, the active spirit opening 
up new aspects and paths of investigation in a creative attitude which never 
rested, never lost its grip in difficult situations. Thus one was brought by him to 
the attitude of creative philosophising and one could enjoy the participation 
in the development of a new philosophy, though one was in fact merely a philo-
sophical child.58 
 
This is praise of a kind which Husserl never received from any of his students. 
Yet the ability to convey difficult and complex ideas in a clear form did not 
come easily to Reinach. The preparation of his lectures not only took up a great 
deal of his time, it was experienced by him as an almost unbearable burden: ‘All 
those brilliant performances were the result of unspeakable labour and pain.’59 
Given the high standards which he set for himself, however, it is not surprising 
that most of his published works should have grown so readily out of his lectures, 
almost without revision. 
As was befitting for a newly qualified Privatdozent, Reinach’s courses were 
intended mainly for beginners. In the winter of 1909/10 he gave a course of lec-
tures entitled “Introduction to the Theory of Cognition”60 and a seminar on the 
philosophy of history, the latter involving particularly discussions of the Lippsian 
topic of empathy. Reinach also seems to have presided over the sessions of the 
Göttingen Philosophical Society, an association of Husserl-students in Göttingen 
which had been established by Conrad after the model of the Munich Verein. 
For all this, however, he continued to miss his Munich friends: 
 
The loneliness in Göttingen is terrible. Sometimes I have felt so much out of this 
world that I have thought that I could bear it no longer. Then I do nothing but 
read railway-timetables and run out to the station. Not a nice story!61 
 
In the summer semester of 1910 he gave a course of lectures on Plato which seems 
to have particularly impressed those who heard it. The theme of the lectures – 
                                                 
58
  In E. Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, The Hague: Nijjoff, 1968, 114. Compare also 
Hildebrand’s remark in his Moralia, Regensburg: Habbel, 1980, 486: ‘Welch unerhörtes Ge-
schenk war es, ein Schüler des genialen Adolf Reinach sein zu dürfen.’ 
59
  E. Stein, Aus dem Leben einer jüdischen Familie, Louvain-Freiburg: E. Nauwelaerts-
Herder, 1965, 195. 
60
  “Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie”: we employ the translation “Theory of Cognition” 
rather than the more usual “Epistemology” or “Theory of Knowledge”, here, in order to draw 
a firm line between the conception of Erkenntnistheorie as a descriptive discipline (a con-
ception to be found above all in the work of Reinach, Stumpf and the early Husserl) and the 
views of the Neo-Kantians, for whom Erkenntnistheorie begins and ends with the question 
‘how is knowledge possible?’ 
61
 Letter to Conrad of 27 October 1909. 
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“Plato’s Philosophy and its Relation to Contemporary Problems in the Theory of 
Cognition” – is entirely characteristic of Reinach’s own philosophical concerns. 
More than thirty students attended and even more participated in his introductory 
seminar on Descartes. One of these, Kurt Stavenhagen, originally a classicist, ‘was 
won over to philosophy through Reinach’.62 
The subsequent vacations Reinach spent in the hills near Stuttgart. On the one 
hand he was still trying to tackle the problem of impersonalia. On the other hand 
he was conscientiously preparing for the next term’s lectures on Kant: 
 
I have 200 pages of Cassirer, 250 pages of Cohen, a fine book of 766 pages 
on Kant by Chamberlain, much of Crusius, Lambert, d’Alembert . . . and almost 
all the pre-critical writings of Kant. I have just finished the Critique of Practical 
Reason.63 
 
At the same time he wrote an obituary article on “William James and Pragmatism” 
which was published in the feuilleton of a Hannover newspaper.64 
In the winter of 1910/11 Reinach gave a course of lectures on “Kant’s Critique 
of Reason”65 and also a seminar on the philosophy of law. It is from the former 
that his two critical articles of 1911 – on “Kant’s Understanding of Hume’s 
Problem” and on “The Most Basic Rules of Inference in Kant” – are derived. In 
addition Reinach took part in the meetings of an inner circle of the “Philosophische 
Gesellschaft” with Hildebrand, Scheler and Alexandre Koyré.66 From the winter 
of 1910/11 Margarete Ortmann attended Reinach’s lectures and seminars. The 
notes she took there, together with those of the Canadian Winthrop Bell, who 
arrived in Göttingen only two semesters later, are the only source for our know-
ledge of the content of Reinach’s lectures. 
In the subsequent vacation he visited Brentano in Florence, calling on Pfänder and 
Daubert in Munich on the way. Pfänder was at this time laying plans for a Fest-
schrift in honour of Theodor Lipps, to which Reinach promised to contribute. 
He submitted his contribution, “On the Theory of the Negative Judgement”, 
deriving in part from his habilitation thesis, in the summer term of 1911. During 
this term he gave seminars on “Selected Problems of Contemporary Philosophy” 
and lectures on “Freedom of the Will, Imputation and Responsibility” – awakening 
his old interest in jurisprudence. It was in this period that Husserl embarked, with 
Reinach’s assistance, upon the revision of the Logical Investigations, the first 
edition of which had been out of print for some years.67 
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  H. Spiegelberg, Scrapbook (unpublished MS, quoted with the author’s permission). 
Stavenhagen later published a treatise – Absolute Stellungnahmen – applying Reinach’s ideas 
to the philosophy of religion. 
63
 Letter to Conrad, September 1910. 
64
 This text is translated on pp. 292–298 in this volume. 
65
  Ana 279 B I 1. 
66
  Koyré later became a prominent historian of philosophy and of science, working es-
pecially on Galileo, Descartes and Newton. The meetings of the Philosophische Gesellschaft 
were regularly attended also by the mathematician Richard Courant who, in conversation 
with Spiegelberg, remembered Reinach as ‘a major figure in the Göttingen philosophical circle’ 
(Spiegelberg, Scrapbook). 
67
 See the discussion in Schuhmann’s paper on Husserl and Reinach on pp. 248f of this volume. 
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The summer vacation of 1911 was spent by Reinach together with his sister and 
some of his friends, including von Hildebrand, in a village close to Munich. This 
made it possible for him to pay extensive visits to Daubert, Pfänder, and Geiger, 
with whom he discussed not only philosophy but also the plans for an annual 
publication of phenomenological research under Husserl’s general editorship, 
plans which were eventually to materialise in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung, E. Husserl (prop.), with Geiger, Scheler, Pfänder 
and Reinach as co-editors. 
In the autumn of 1911 Privatdozent Adolf Reinach, Geismar-Chaussee 7, be-
came a member of the Kant-Gesellschaft.68 In the subsequent semester he repeated 
his course on freedom, imputation and responsibility,69 dealing – among other 
things – with his new notion of social acts, ‘acts, which are not complete in them-
selves’ but ‘to whose essence there belongs the directedness towards an addressee’.70 
These lectures, which included in particular an important treatment of the rele-
vance to the problem of responsibility of the opposition between judgement as 
act and judgement as underlying conviction,71 formed the basis of his article on 
“Deliberation: Its Ethical and Legal Significance”, which was published in 1913. 
He also repeated his earlier introductory seminar on Descartes’ Meditations.72 
Following his custom of keeping away from Göttingen during the vacations, 
he spent the spring of 1912 in Stuttgart, Munich and Vienna. He also spent some 
time in discussions with Paul Kluckhohn, a student of literature who had been 
attending courses by Husserl in Göttingen.73 
 
 
§7  1912–1914: THE DISCOVERY OF SPEECH ACTS 
 
The early phenomenologists, like their predecessors Brentano and Meinong in 
Austria – and unlike the representatives of other dominant philosophical trends 
in Germany – had a special sympathy and regard for the British philosophical 
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  Kant-Studien, 16 (1911), 525. 
69
 Ana 379 B I 2 and B II 1. 
70
  ‘Akte, die nicht in sich selbst ruhen’ (Ana 379 B II 1, 334). See also Ana 379 B I 1, 14 
Dec. 1911. 
71
 Ana 379 B II 1, 308f. 
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 Ana 379 B I 3. One of the students attending ‘many of the lectures . . . of Reinach’ 
around this time was the psychologist Erwin Straus. See H. Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 264 and Scrapbook. Reinach’s influence can perhaps be detected 
in Straus’s “Wesen und Vorgang der Suggestion” of 1925 (repr. in his Psychologie der 
menschlichen Welt, Berlin: Springer, 1960, 17–70), especially in his treatment of the Husserlian 
theory of meaning and communication. 
73
  Kluckhohn later enjoyed a distinguished career as a specialist in the field of German 
romantic literature, becoming famous as an editor of Novalis. At this time he was working 
on a book later published as Die Auffassung der Liebe in der Literatur des 18, Jahrhunderts 
und in der deutschen Romantik (Halle: Niemeyer, 1922), the greater part of which was written 
in 1912. In the Foreword to the book Kluckhohn writes: ‘Den unvergeßlichen Adolf Reinach, 
mit dem ich mehrere Abschnitte, die die Geschichte der Philosophie betreffen, noch durch-
sprechen durfte, erreicht ein gedruckter Dank nicht mehr.’ (vi). 
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tradition.74 This sympathy is especially strongly marked in the work of Reinach: 
it can be detected already in the deliberate clarity of his prose, and is clearly in-
dicated by his choice of subject-matter for lectures and seminars. These included, 
in the summer semester of 1912, a carefully worked out course on “Hume and 
English Empiricism”, which dealt not only with Hume and the problem of causality 
but also with Bacon and Hobbes (on his nominalism), Locke (especially on his 
theory of generality and abstraction), and Berkeley (on the relation between 
perception and judgement). He concluded the course with a remark to the effect 
that: 
 
The English empricists had many phenomenological insights. And these remain. 
But because no one had the idea of phenomenology these insights were misted 
over through the influence of Kant and his awful successors. Today things are 
somewhat different.75 
 
In the same semester Reinach also gave a seminar on “The Philosophy of Civil 
Law”, which was clearly a step towards the preparation of his contribution to the 
first volume of Husserl’s Jahrbuch (1913) – “The A Priori Foundations of Civil 
Law” – Reinach’s masterpiece on the theory of social acts. 
The investigation of the action of promising and of other speech actions which 
forms the core of this work did not grow out of a vacuum. As we have already 
seen, it was influenced in part by ideas which Reinach had absorbed as a student of 
law. But it was also part of a more strictly philosophical tradition in Munich, rooted 
in Daubert’s criticisms of Husserl. 
The full extent of Daubert’s contribution to the early history of speech act 
theory in Germany will be established only when his considerable Nachlaß has been 
more extensively transcribed. From our present point of view, however, it is suf-
ficient to point out that, as we know from his manuscripts, Daubert had demon-
strated in a long series of discussions with other phenomenologists in Munich that 
there are certain inadequacies in the theory of meaning set out in the Logical 
Investigations. Most importantly, this theory leaves no room for the meanings of 
questions, and of other, related uses of language which are not simply ‘objectifying’ 
in Husserl’s sense.76 Daubert stressed in particular the difference between  
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 The 2nd of Husserl’s Logical Investigations is of course devoted to the theories of ab-
straction of the British empiricists. Theodor Lipps was responsible for the standard German 
translation of Hume’s Treatise and directed dissertations on Hume not only by Schwenninger 
(see n.11 above) but also by Anton Feigs (Die Begriffe der Existenz, Substanz und Kausalität 
bei Hume, 1904). Further, the dissertation of P. F. Linke on Hume’s concept of relation (D. 
Humes Lehre vom Wissen. Ein Beitrag zur Relationstheorie im Anschuß an Locke und Hume, 
Leipzig: Engelmann, 1901), though submitted in Liepzig, was in fact prompted by Lipps, under 
whom Linke had studied in 1897 and 1898. (See GS 21, n.1, where Reinach praises Linke’s 
work.) 
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  Ana 379 B II 2, 26. Compare Husserl’s “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen. . .” (1930), where 
Husserl describes Hume’s Treatise as ‘der erste Entwurf einer geschlossenen Phänomenologie’ 
(Husserliana V, 155). 
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 An entire file in Daubert’s Nachlaß is devoted to the logic and phenomenology of ques-
tions (Daubertiana A I 2). This file was written in the period 1911–12, though Daubert’s 
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1. the question (die Frage) as a purely logical formation, 
2. questionings (das Fragen) as acts occurring within the inner life of the sub-
ject which are, like judgements, directed primarily towards objects in the 
world as part of the process of gaining knowledge. They are thus distinct 
from strivings, desires and other acts whose primary orientation is toward 
oneself, 
and 
3. questions (Anfragen) as uses of language directed to another subject. 
 
Closely related ideas are then put forward in the sketch of a “Theory of Impera-
tives” drawn up by Pfänder in the summer of 1909,77 but now in relation to 
commands and related phenomena (permissions, requests, etc.). Pfänder is con-
cerned particularly with the various ways of classifying imperatives, and with the 
range of modifications to which they may be subjected – for example when they 
are addressed not to a single person but to a (determinate or indeterminate) col-
lective. But Pfänder’s work remains a mere sketch, and even the long list of dif-
ferent sorts of speech actions which is to be found in his Logik of 192178 is pre-
sented merely as a classification of the different varieties of ‘logical content’, i.e. 
in such a way as to make clear that Pfänder is not yet truly aware of the signifi-
cance of the fact that the uses of language he describes are specific sorts of actions. 
That is, in Beling’s, Reinach’s and Bühler’s terms, Pfänder fails to capture the ex-
ternal aspects of the structures involved. It is only in Reinach’s monograph of 1913 
that we find both (i) a truly systematic theory of the various different sorts of 
speech actions and of their modifications and (ii) a clear awareness that the phe-
nomena in question belong to the world of action, that they have both an in-
ternal and an external dimension.79 
In September 1912 Reinach married Anna Stettenheimer.80 
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In the winter of 1912/13 he was able to hold only a single series of introductory 
seminars on Kant’s Prolegomena, dealing among other things with the problem of 
a priori existential judgements and the concept of space.81 A good deal of his time 
seems to have been absorbed by the first volume of the Jahrbuch, of which he was at 
that stage managing editor. The proof-reading of Scheler’s contribution, in par-
ticular, caused him trouble. The volume appeared in 1913, containing, in addition 
to the first book of the Ideas, works by all of Husserl’s co-editors, including 
Reinach’s work on the foundations of the civil law. 
On the basis of the galley-proofs of Pfänder’s contribution “Zur Psychologie 
der Gesinungen”, Reinach did however organise a seminar on this work, in fact 
his first seminar for advanced students. Reference was made in the seminar also 
to Husserl’s Ideen, Reinach insisting, in opposition to Husserl, that there is still 
room for a type of phenomenology as descriptive psychology.82 
Also in the summer term of 1913 Reinach gave a series of seminars for advanced 
students, where he discussed colour and light and our experience of luminous ob-
jects. (‘Can we imagine colourless geometrical figures?)83 He gave also for the 
first time a course of lectures under the title “Introduction to Philosophy”.84 
The latter covered an extremely broad range of subjects, from the theory of sub-
stance to eudemonism and utilitarianism. Here we shall have space only to give 
some hints as to the flavour of Reinach’s approach. External perception in the 
natural attitude is, Reinach says, ‘a seeing which goes through changing modes of 
appearances straight to that which appears – the modes of appearance come to 
attention only in philosophical reflection.’85 It is only with such reflection, which 
in fact destroys the original object-giving acts by dismembering them, that we 
become aware of the evidence or lack of evidence of cogitationes. Descartes’ 
assertion that this sphere of phenomena is marked by an outstanding degree of 
clarity and distinctness is therefore unjustified. There follows a treatment of the 
‘ontological problem of the structure of the various types of object’, including 
a discussion of the relation between the extension and colour of a material thing. 
‘Ontology’, Reinach says, ‘investigates the thing as thing, the process as process, 
the state as state.’ ‘Objects exist or do not exist [existieren]: states of affairs sub-
sist or do not subsist [bestehen]: meanings hold or do not hold [gelten] of states 
                                                                                                                                     
years later. 
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of affairs, and are accordingly true or false.86 There follows a discussion of gene-
rality and of the a priori, and of Kant’s unfortunate identification of the a priori 
with the formal and of the empirical with the material. Reinach then applies the 
results of this discussion to the sphere of ethics, criticising Kant’s formalism there 
also: ‘an act of forgiving has consequences in the world’; ‘things do not have value 
as they have extension and the like’.87 The true autonomy of ethics, Reinach 
insists, lies in the irreducibility of those feelings which relate to values: Kant, how-
ever, ‘treats emotional position-takings as if they were no different from tooth-
aches’.88 
The surviving notes of these lectures reveal that Reinach did not merely present 
results of his own work in the fields of theory of judgement and of ethics; he also 
took up some of the problems discussed by Husserl in the newly published Ideas 
I, and indeed he adopted Husserl’s terminology of the ‘natural attitude’. Thus it is 
something of an exaggeration to suggest that, after the publication of the Ideas, 
‘Reinach and, following him, the others broke away from the new developments’ 
as Husserl had said to Dorion Cairns in 1931.89 Rather, as ever, the Munich pheno-
menologists adopted a cautious, critical attitude to what was taking place around 
them. 
It was at the beginning of this term that Edith Stein arrived in Göttingen: 
 
In Breslau Mos[kiewicz] had given me the instruction: when one arrives in 
Göttingen one goes first of all to Reinach; he then takes care of everything 
else . . . Reinach was above all the mediator between Husserl and the students, 
for he understood extremely well how to deal with other people, whereas 
Husserl was pretty hopeless in this respect.90 
 
In the winter semester of 1913/14 Reinach gave a broad historical course on the 
history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant and a further series of semi-
nars for advanced students, “The Theory of Categories”, discussing categorial 
concepts such as identity and ordinal and cardinal number, the concept of series, 
and including an excursus on Zeno’s paradoxes of motion.91 The transcriptions 
of these seminars are particularly interesting, since they reveal that Reinach was 
perhaps the only philosopher in Germany at this time lecturing on the work of 
Frege. 
Stein has described her experiences of these courses in her autobiography as 
follows: 
 
It was a pure joy to hear them. True, [Reinach] had a manuscript before him, 
but he hardly seemed to look into it. He spoke in a lively and cheerful tone, 
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softly, freely, and elegantly, and everything was transparently clear and com-
pelling. One had the impression that it did not cost him any effort at all. When 
later on I was able to look at these manuscripts I noticed to my extreme amaze-
ment that they were written out word for word from beginning to end . . . 
The hours spent in Reinach’s fine study were the happiest of my entire time 
in Göttingen. We students were all agreed that, as far as method was concerned, 
it was here that we learned the most. Reinach discussed with us the questions 
which were occupying him in his own research, in that winter semester the 
problem of motion. It was not a matter of him lecturing and us learning, but 
rather a common searching, similar to what he had in the Philosophische Gesell-
schaft but under the hand of a sure guide . . . These evenings, too, however, were 
a torture to him. When the two hours were over, he could not bear to hear the 
word ‘motion’ anymore.92 
 
In January 1914 Reinach gave his lecture “On Phenomenology” in Marburg, still 
at that time a centre of neo-Kantian philosophy. This lecture, too, contains a brief 
discussion of Frege, and more specifically of Frege’s views on the status of asser-
tions of number such as ‘There are four horses pulling the Kaiser’s coach’. Reinach 
dismisses Frege’s conception of such statements as assertions about concepts; ‘a 
concept under which four objects fall,’ Reinach argues, ‘is just as little four as a 
concept which subsumes material things is for that reason itself material’.93 On 
returning to Göttingen Reinach provided the members of his seminar with an 
account of his ‘missionary activities’ in Marburg.94 On the basis of Bell’s notes we 
can hazard that his audience in Marburg had been particularly curious about the 
phenomenological theory of the judgement as positing act and about the con-
ception of propositions [Sätze] as entities constituted in the process of thinking.95 
Reinach himself, of course, held that there exist, in addition to judgements and 
propositions, also autonomous states of affairs, independent of our acts and prior 
to all constitution, and Kantians in Marburg – who included Natorp himself – 
seem to have been less sympathetic to this aspect of his position. The Austrians, 
in contrast, make precisely the opposite mistake: ‘Stumpf, Bergmann (Bolzano 
too) . . . all Austirans confuse proposition and Sachverhald continually’.96 
In 1914 Reinach published a long review of Natorp’s Allgemeine Psychologie of 
1912 (we can conjecture that his attention was drawn to this work in connection 
with his visit to Marburg). This was to be his last publication. 
In April 1914 he participated, with Husserl, in the 6th Congress of Experimental 
Psychology in Göttingen. In the subsequent semester he repeated his lectures on 
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“Hume and English Empiricism” and his introductory seminar on Descartes. He 
also gave once more a seminar for advanced students on “The Theory of Cate-
gories” in which Zeno’s paradoxes were again discussed. In Ingarden’s opinion 
this was ‘the most interesting and instructive seminar’ which Reinach ever gave.97 
It was apparently this seminar which inspired Alexandre Koyré’s “Remarks on 
Zeno’s Paradoxes” which are indeed dedicated ‘to the memory of Adolf Reinach’.98 
This seminar seems also to be identical with ‘Reinach’s small seminar on Bergson, 
Zeit und Freiheit, and on the concepts of continuum, time and movement’ from 
which it is reported that Hans Lipps’ interest in Zeno’s and related paradoxes 
sprang.99 
 
 
§8  1914–1917: AT THE FRONT 
 
For the winter of 1914/15 Reinach announced for the second time lectures on the 
history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant. He also planned to give a 
seminar for beginners on Locke and Leibniz – probably on Leibniz’ Nouveaux 
Essais – and another seminar for more advanced students. But these projects did 
not come to fruition. Like the other phenomenologists, indeed like almost all 
German intellectuals of the time, Reinach was carried away by the enthusiasm 
which broke out after the declaration of war between Germany and the allied 
powers. He immediately volunteered for the army, and even exerted pressure to 
ensure that he be admitted into the service as quickly as possible. He was recruited 
in his home town of Mainz around the middle of August and after two weeks 
of training assigned to a reserve battery of the 21st Field Artillery Regiment of the 
21st Reserve Division under the immediate command of his younger brother 
Heinrich. As a recruit he was posted to Gonsenheim, ‘a tiny hole’ in the neigh-
bourhood of Mainz, before being transferred to France. 
For the summer semester of 1915 Reinach announced lectures on the theory of 
cognition and seminars on Hume and on the aims and methods of aesthetics. But 
he announced these courses only ‘with some pain,’ as he wrote to Husserl, ‘for after 
all, I will not in fact give them”. From the 12th of February he was part of the 
assault group, still under the command of his brother but now fighting from the 
trenches against the French. His mood nevertheless remained fundamentally as it 
had been at the outbreak of the War. In a letter to Conrad-Martius of April 21, 
1915 he spoke of the ‘supreme happiness that has been granted to me in my life 
to stake all my earthly goods on something that is for me great and holy.’ With 
this disregard for his own life, however, there went a high estimation of the sig-
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nificance of phenomenology. As he wrote, prophetically, to Conrad-Martius on 
September 10, 1915: 
 
I believe that phenomenology can provide that which the new Germany and the 
new Europe stand in need of. I believe that a great future lies open to it, but at 
the same time I see this future in extreme danger . . . We have lost many a young 
gifted worker through the War, and I, too, do not know whether I shall be 
returning home. 
 
From his post at the front Reinach continued to announce courses in the Göttingen 
Vorlesungsverzeichnis.100 On November 5, 1915 in a letter to Conrad-Martius he 
describes the retreat of his unit after it had lost its position to the French: 
 
We are once more in our old position with the battery; my brother and I were 
with two heavy guns on Hill 191. We lost both hill and artillery. But we left 
the guns only after our own infantry were already behind us and so we came 
under threat of being shot at by our own troops. When we were on our way 
back we came upon another German battery which had already been aban-
doned by the gunners and we ourselves mounted it and shot at the advancing 
Frenchmen until night fell. These were often terrible hours, in which one settled 
one’s accounts with life. But this is nevertheless the proudest time of my life. 
 
Such experiences – Reinach was awarded the Iron Cross for his part in the above 
engagement – make it perhaps understandable that, while on leave in Göttingen 
in 1916, he was baptised, together with his wife, and received in the Protestant 
Church. 
From November 1915 Reinach was stationed in the supply lines serving the 
Belgian front. From October 1916 he was stationed near Soissons, now as platoon 
commander in the 185th Field Artillery Regiment. Whenever possible, however, 
he continued with his work on philosophy. Whilst on leave in Göttingen for the 
Christmas of 1916 he looked up his old notes on motion and began to rework 
them at the front in January 1917.101 On July 26, 1916 he wrote the fragment 
‘On the Phenomenology of Premonitions’ and between September 28 and October 
3, 1917 he wrote three further fragments on the philosophy of religion, announcing 
for the winter semester of 1917/18 a lecture course on the same subject. 
On the 16th of November, 1917, Reinach fell outside Diksmuide in Flanders.  
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§9  EPILOGUE 
 
There are not many philosophers whose works were posthumously edited by 
their disciples – Hegel being of course the most famous example. Reinach’s case is 
all the more conspicuous as his academic career – as a mere Privatdozent – lasted 
only slightly over four years. His Collected Writings of 1921, ‘herausgegeben von 
seinen Schülern, as the title page indicates, constitute in themselves a worthy 
testimony to a philosopher who was described by Husserl, in his obituary of 1917, 
as ‘one of the few firm and great hopes of contemporary philosophy’.102 
On volunteering for the army in 1914, Reinach had given his wife Anna instruc-
tions to destroy his papers in case he should be killed. They were, in his view, mere 
drafts, not fit for publication. However, his widow kept them with her even after 
1917, thus allowing for the posthumous publication in the Gesammelte Schriften 
of the lecture on phenomenology and of the pieces on movement and on imper-
sonalia. When, however, Anna Reinach was herself forced to leave Germany in 
early 1942 as a result of the National Socialist persecution of the Jews, she finally 
burnt all of Reinach’s papers. Under the signature Ana 379 the Bavarian State 
Library in Munich now houses a small number of surviving letters and other frag-
ments, including the short curriculum vitae of Reinach by his wife Anna and the 
notes of Reinach’s lectures and seminars taken by his students Margarete Ortmann 
and Winthrop Bell.  
                                                 
102 ‘Eine der wenigen sicheren und grossen Hoffnungen der zeitgenössischen Philosophie’. 
